Economics 205 Final Examination

Professors Komunjer and Toda Fall 2016

Name:				
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Instructions:

- You have three hours to complete this closed-book examination. You may use scratch paper, but please write your final answers (including your complete arguments) on these sheets. Calculators are allowed.
- All logarithms are base e = 2.718281828..., so $\ln x$ and $\log x$ are the same.

Question:	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Points:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Score:							

1. Let K and K' be two compact sets in \mathbb{R} . We will define their $sum\ K+K'\subseteq\mathbb{R}$ as follows:

$$K + K' = \{ z \in \mathbb{R} \mid z = x + y, (x, y) \in K \times K' \}.$$

(a) Give the characterization of compactness in terms of sequences.

Solution:

(b) Use (a) to show that K + K' is compact.

Solution:

2. This question consists of two parts which are largely independent. If you cannot establish the results required in (a), you can proceed with (b) by assuming (a) has been shown.

Let (a, b) be a couple of strictly positive real numbers (i.e. a > 0, b > 0), and let r be real (i.e. $r \in \mathbb{R}$). Define

$$M_r(a,b) = \left\lceil \frac{a^r + b^r}{2} \right\rceil^{1/r}, \quad \text{if } r \neq 0,$$

and

$$M_0(a,b) = \sqrt{ab}$$
.

(a) Show that for any a > 0 and b > 0, $M_r(a, b)$ is continuous (as a function of r) at zero, i.e. that for any a > 0 and b > 0,

$$\lim_{r\to 0} M_r(a,b) = M_0(a,b).$$

(Hint: use the fact that for any x > 0 and $y \in \mathbb{R}$, we can write $x^y = \exp(y \ln x)$.)

Solution:

(b) We focus on $M_{-1}(a, b)$, $M_0(a, b)$, and $M_1(a, b)$, which are called, respectively, the harmonic mean, geometric mean, and ordinary arithmetic mean of a and b. Show that we have

$$M_0(a,b) \le M_1(a,b).$$

(Hint: combine the square of a sum with the square of a difference.) Show that in addition

$$M_{-1}(a,b) \le M_0(a,b).$$

(Hint: write $M_{-1}(a,b)$ as a function of $M_1(1/a,1/b)$.)

Solution:

3. Let \mathbf{x} be a vector in \mathbb{R}^n and let $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}^{\mathsf{T}}$. What is the rank of \mathbf{A} ? (hint: consider the following two cases: (1) $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$ and (2) $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{0}$, and compute the rank of \mathbf{A} in each case.)

Solution:

4. Consider an agent with utility function

$$U(x_1, x_2) = (1 - \alpha) \log x_1 + \alpha \log x_2,$$

where $0 < \alpha < 1$. Suppose that the prices of goods 1, 2 are p_1, p_2 . Consider the expenditure minimization problem

minimize
$$p_1x_1 + p_2x_2$$

subject to $U(x_1, x_2) \ge u$, $x_1, x_2 \ge 0$,

where $u \in \mathbb{R}$ is the target utility level.

(a) Are the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions necessary for a solution? Answer yes or no, then explain why.

Solution: Yes. The problem is equivalent to

minimize
$$p_1x_1 + p_2x_2$$
subject to
$$-(1-\alpha)\log x_1 - \alpha\log x_2 + u \le 0,$$

$$-x_1 \le 0,$$

$$-x_2 \le 0.$$

Clearly the objective function is linear (hence convex). The constraint functions are all convex since $\log x$ is concave. Therefore the problem is a convex minimization problem. Furthermore, the Slater constraint qualification holds by taking x_1, x_2 large enough. Hence the assumptions of the KKT theorem are satisfied.

(b) Are the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions sufficient for a solution? Answer yes or no, then explain why.

Solution: Since the problem is a convex minimization problem, the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality.

(c) Let $e(p_1, p_2, u)$ be the minimum expenditure and $x_l(p_1, p_2, u)$ be the optimal demand, where l = 1, 2. Compute x_1, x_2 .

Solution: Clearly the constraints $x_l \ge 0$ do not bind, since utility is $-\infty$ when $x_l = 0$. Hence we can ignore these constraints. The Lagrangian is

$$L(x,\lambda) = p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 + \lambda (-(1-\alpha)\log x_1 - \alpha \log x_2 + u).$$

The first-order conditions are $p_1 - \lambda(1 - \alpha)/x_1 = 0$ and $p_2 - \lambda \alpha/x_2 = 0$, so $x_1 = \frac{\lambda(1-\alpha)}{p_1}$ and $x_2 = \frac{\lambda\alpha}{p_2}$. Clearly $\lambda > 0$, so by complementary slackness, we have

$$u = (1 - \alpha)\log x_1 + \alpha\log x_2 = \log \lambda - (1 - \alpha)\log p_1 - \alpha\log p_2 + H(\alpha),$$

where $H(\alpha) := \alpha \log \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \log(1 - \alpha)$. Taking the exponential, we get

$$\lambda = e^u p_1^{1-\alpha} p_2^{\alpha} \alpha^{-\alpha} (1-\alpha)^{-(1-\alpha)}.$$

Therefore

$$x_1 = e^u \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1} \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha},$$

$$x_2 = e^u \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1 - \alpha}.$$

(d) Compute $\partial e(p_1, p_2, u)/\partial p_1$.

Solution: By the envelope theorem,

$$\frac{\partial e(p_1, p_2, u)}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial p_1} = x_1.$$

5. Consider an agent who can invest in two assets, a stock and a risk-free bond. Let $R_f > 0$ be the gross risk-free rate and R be the gross return of the stock, which can take S different values $R_1, \ldots, R_S > 0$ with probability π_1, \ldots, π_S . Suppose that the agent wants to maximize the log portfolio return

$$v(\theta) := \mathbb{E}[\log(R\theta + R_f(1-\theta))] = \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s \log(R_s\theta + R_f(1-\theta)),$$

where θ is the fraction of wealth invested in the stock. (It is allowed to shortsell the stock ($\theta < 0$) as well as buy the stock on margin ($\theta > 1$).) Let θ^* be the optimal portfolio.

(a) Show that the objective function v is strictly concave.

Solution:

$$v''(\theta) = -\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s \frac{(R_s - R_f)^2}{(R_s \theta + R_f (1 - \theta))^2} < 0,$$

so v is strictly concave.

(b) Show that θ^* is unique.

Solution: Suppose that $\theta_1 < \theta_2$ are two solutions. Then $v(\theta_1) = v(\theta_2)$. Take any $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. By strict concavity, we have

$$v((1-\alpha)\theta_1 + \alpha\theta_2) > (1-\alpha)v(\theta_1) + \alpha v(\theta_2) = v(\theta_1),$$

so the portfolio $\theta_3 = (1 - \alpha)\theta_1 + \alpha\theta_2$ gives higher utility than θ_1 , which is a contradiction.

(c) Derive the first-order condition.

Solution:

$$v'(\theta) = E\left[\frac{R - R_f}{R\theta + R_f(1 - \theta)}\right] = 0.$$

(d) Show that $\partial \theta^*/\partial R_f < 0$, so if the risk-free rate goes up, the agent invests less in stock.

Solution: Let

$$F(R_f, \theta) = E\left[\frac{R - R_f}{R\theta + R_f(1 - \theta)}\right].$$

Then $F(R_f, \theta^*) = 0$. By the implicit function theorem, we have

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*}{\partial R_f} = -\frac{D_{R_f} F}{D_{\theta} F}$$

By simple algebra,

$$D_{\theta}F = \frac{\partial F}{\partial \theta} = -\operatorname{E}\left[\frac{(R - R_f)^2}{(R\theta + R_f(1 - \theta))^2}\right] < 0,$$

$$D_{R_f}F = \frac{\partial F}{\partial R_f} = \operatorname{E}\left[\frac{-(R\theta + R_f(1 - \theta)) - (R - R_f)(1 - \theta)}{(R\theta + R_f(1 - \theta))^2}\right]$$

$$= -\operatorname{E}\left[\frac{R}{(R\theta + R_f(1 - \theta))^2}\right] < 0,$$

so $\partial \theta^*/\partial R_f < 0$.

6. (a) What is the definition of a convex function?

Solution: Let Ω be a convex set. $f: \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$ is convex if for all $x_1, x_2 \in \Omega$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, we have $f((1 - \alpha)x_1 + \alpha x_2) \leq (1 - \alpha)f(x_1) + \alpha f(x_2)$.

(b) What is the definition of a quasi-convex function?

Solution: Let Ω be a convex set. $f: \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$ is quasi-convex if for all $x_1, x_2 \in \Omega$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, we have $f((1 - \alpha)x_1 + \alpha x_2) \leq \max\{f(x_1), f(x_2)\}$.

(c) Let $g_1, g_2 : \mathbb{R}^N \to \mathbb{R}$ be convex, and $h : \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$ be increasing and quasi-convex. (h is increasing if $h(x_1, x_2) \le h(y_1, y_2)$ whenever $x_1 \le y_1$ and $x_2 \le y_2$.) Define $f : \mathbb{R}^N \to \mathbb{R}$ by $f(x) = h(g_1(x), g_2(x))$. Prove that h is quasi-convex.

Solution: Take any $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{R}^N$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. Since g_i is convex, we have $g_i((1 - \alpha)x_1 + \alpha x_2) \leq (1 - \alpha)g_i(x_1) + \alpha g_i(x_2)$. Define $G : \mathbb{R}^N \to \mathbb{R}^2$ by $G(x) = \begin{bmatrix} g_1(x) \\ g_2(x) \end{bmatrix}$. Then

$$G((1-\alpha)x_1 + \alpha x_2) \le (1-\alpha)G(x_1) + \alpha G(x_2),$$

where the inequality is component-wise. Applying h to both sides, and using the fact that h is increasing and quasi-convex, it follows that

$$f((1 - \alpha)x_1 + \alpha x_2) = h(G((1 - \alpha)x_1 + \alpha x_2))$$

$$\leq h((1 - \alpha)G(x_1) + \alpha G(x_2))$$

$$\leq \max\{h(G(x_1)), h(G(x_2))\} = \max\{f(x_1), f(x_2)\},$$

so f is quasi-convex.