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## Housing Bubbles with Phase Transitions<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Link to paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11365 ( B > ( E > ( E > ( E > ( C

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## Housing price and rent

- Connection between housing price and rent is not tight
- Examples:

Introduction

- Trend in housing price and rent indexes
- Cross-section of housing price and rent
- Upward trend in price-rent ratio in many countries during past three decades (Amaral et al., 2024; Bäcker-Peral et al., 2024)
   Image
- In popular press, often referred to as "housing bubble"
- Understanding why and how housing bubbles emerge is of interest because housing booms and bust often associated with macroeconomic problems (Jordà et al., 2015)

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## Rational asset price bubbles

- Bubble: asset price (P) > fundamental value (V)
  - V = present value of dividends (D)
- Fundamental difficulty in generating asset price bubbles in real assets
  - Santos and Woodford (1997): bubble impossible if dividends nonnegligible relative to endowments
  - See Hirano and Toda (2024a, JME) for illustration
- Theory of rational asset price bubbles attached to dividend-paying assets (including housing) largely underdeveloped
  - See Wilson (1981, JET), Hirano and Toda (2024b, JPE)



## Questions

- 1. How can housing prices be disconnected from fundamentals in rational general equilibrium model?
- 2. How is disconnection related to economic conditions (e.g., income, credit) and expectation formation?
- 3. What are efficiency properties of equilibria with housing?



## This paper

- Theoretically study equilibrium housing price in plain-vanilla OLG model with housing
- Main results
  - 1. Two-stage phase transition: as income share of home buyers  $\uparrow$ , equilibrium regime transitions

fundamental equilibrium (P = V) only  $\rightarrow$ coexistence of fundamental & bubbly eq. (bubble possibility)  $\rightarrow$ bubbly equilibrium (P > V) only (bubble necessity)



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2. Expectation- or credit-driven housing bubbles: if home buyers expect high future income or access to credit, housing bubbles emerge



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fundamental equilibrium (P = V) only

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- 2. Expectation- or credit-driven housing bubbles: if home buyers expect high future income or access to credit, housing bubbles emerge
- 3. Welfare analysis: in bubble possibility regime, fundamental equilibria inefficient (overturn McCallum (1987))

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## Related literature

• Housing: Piazzesi and Schneider (2016)

Introduction

- Monetary/bubble theory: Samuelson (1958), Bewley (1980), Tirole (1985)
- Housing as pure bubble: Kocherlakota (2009, 2013), Arce and López-Salido (2011), Chen and Wen (2017), Graczyk and Phan (2021), etc.
  - Unlike these papers, rent > 0, equilibrium determinate
- Bubble Necessity: Hirano and Toda (2024b)
  - Unlike this paper, dividend (rent) endogenous

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### Model

- Time: t = 0, 1, ...
- Two period overlapping generations (OLG) model (young & old) with two goods (consumption & housing service)
- Utility U(c<sup>y</sup><sub>t</sub>, c<sup>o</sup><sub>t+1</sub>, h<sub>t</sub>), where c<sup>y</sup><sub>t</sub>: young consumption, c<sup>o</sup><sub>t+1</sub>: old consumption, h<sub>t</sub>: housing service
- Endowment of consumption good:  $e_t^y > 0$  for young,  $e_t^o > 0$  for old
- Housing stock in unit supply, initially owned by old; housing stock produces housing service every period

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## Model

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- Endowment of consumption good:  $e_t^y > 0$  for young,  $e_t^o > 0$  for old
- Housing stock in unit supply, initially owned by old; housing stock produces housing service every period
  - Think of consumption good as apple, housing service as banana, and housing stock as banana tree



## Markets

- Perfect commodity, housing, and rental markets
- Budget constraints:

Young: 
$$c_t^y + P_t x_t + r_t h_t \le e_t^y$$
,  
Old:  $c_{t+1}^o \le e_{t+1}^o + (P_{t+1} + r_{t+1})x_t$ ,

where  $x_t$ : housing stock,  $P_t$ : housing price,  $r_t$ : housing rent

- Gross risk-free rate  $R_t = (P_{t+1} + r_{t+1})/P_t$
- Can combine budget constraint as

$$c_t^y + rac{c_{t+1}^o}{R_t} + r_t h_t \le e_t^y + rac{e_{t+1}^o}{R_t}$$

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## Equilibrium

- As usual, equilibrium defined by
  - optimization
  - market clearing

## Definition

Model

Rational expectations equilibrium consists of prices  $\{(P_t, r_t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and allocations  $\{(c_t^y, c_t^o, h_t, x_t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  such that for each t,

- 1. (Individual optimization) Young maximize utility  $U(c_t^y, c_{t+1}^o, h_t)$  subject to budget constraints,
- 2. (Commodity market clearing)  $c_t^y + c_t^o = e_t^y + e_t^o$ ,
- 3. (Rental market clearing)  $h_t = 1$ ,
- 4. (Housing market clearing)  $x_t = 1$

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## Equilibrium characterization

• Let  $S_t = P_t + r_t$  be housing expenditure

Model

- Market clearing implies  $x_t = h_t = 1$  and hence  $c_t^y = e_t^y S_t$ ,  $c_{t+1}^o = e_{t+1}^o + S_{t+1}$
- For simplicity, write  $(c^y, c^o) = (y, z)$ ; first-order conditions imply  $1/R_t = U_z/U_y$  and  $r_t = U_h/U_y$
- Combining these with  $R_t = S_{t+1}/P_t$  yields

$$S_{t+1}U_z = S_tU_y - U_h$$

- Hence equilibrium fully characterized by sequence of housing expenditure {S<sub>t</sub>}<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=0</sub> satisfying this difference equation
  - Can show existence of equilibrium

### Definition of bubbles

• Asset dividend  $D_t \geq 0$ , price  $P_t \geq 0$  at  $t = 0, 1, \dots$ 

Model

• With Arrow-Debreu (date-0) price  $q_t > 0$ , no-arbitrage implies

$$egin{aligned} q_t P_t &= q_{t+1}(P_{t+1}+D_{t+1}), & ext{so} \ P_0 &= \sum_{t=1}^T q_t D_t + q_T P_T & ext{by iteration} \end{aligned}$$

### Definition of bubbles

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• Letting  $T \to \infty$ , get

Model



• If  $\lim_{T\to\infty} q_T P_T = 0$ , transversality condition holds and no bubble; if > 0, bubble

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## Bubble Characterization Lemma

#### Lemma

Model

If  $P_t > 0$  for all t, asset price exhibits bubble if and only if

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{D_t}{P_t} < \infty$$

- This is Proposition 7 of Montrucchio (2004)
- Hence bubble if and only if sum of dividend yields finite
- Except pure bubble models ( $D_t \equiv 0$ ), bubbles are fundamentally nonstationary phenomena: price must grow faster than dividend

## Bubble Necessity Theorem

- Consider OLG endowment economy with dividend-paying asset
- Let long run dividend growth be  $G_d \coloneqq \limsup_{t o \infty} D_t^{1/t}$

Lemma (Hirano and Toda, 2024b, Theorem 2)

Model

Suppose that (i) utility function U(y, z) is continuously differentiable, homothetic, and quasi-concave, and (ii) endowments satisfy  $G^{-t}(e_t^y, e_t^o) \rightarrow (e_1, e_2)$  as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ , where G > 0,  $e_1 > 0$ , and  $e_2 \ge 0$ . Let  $R := (U_y/U_z)(e_1, e_2)$  be long run autarky interest rate. If

$$R < G_d < G$$
,

then all equilibria are bubbly with asset price  $P_t$  satisfying  $\liminf_{t\to\infty} P_t/e_t^y > 0$ .

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## Assumptions

#### Assumption (Endowments)

There exist G > 1,  $e_1$ ,  $e_2 > 0$ , and T > 0 such that the endowments are  $(e_t^y, e_t^o) = (e_1G^t, e_2G^t)$  for  $t \ge T$ 

- Constant income ratio and growth in long run
- Justification of G > 1 Image

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## Assumptions

### Assumption (Utility)

The utility function takes form

$$U(y,z,h) = u(c(y,z)) + v(h),$$

#### where

- 1. composite consumption c(y, z) is homogeneous of degree 1, quasi-concave (and differentiable, Inada condition)
- 2. utility of composite consumption is  $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$  for some  $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ ,
- 3. utility of housing service satisfies v' > 0.

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## Justification of $\gamma < \mathbf{1}$

- Interpretations of  $\gamma$ :
  - reciprocal of elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing service
  - elasticity of rent with respect to income
- (Empirical)
  - Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) find  $\gamma = 1/1.24 = 0.81$  from ES between durable & non-durable consumption
  - Piazzesi et al. (2007) find  $\gamma = 1/1.27 = 0.79$  from cointegration of price & quantity of housing service
  - Howard and Liebersohn (2021) find  $\gamma = 0.79$  from cross-sectional regression
- (Theoretical)  $\gamma > 1$  is pathological
  - price/rent  $\rightarrow$  0 as  $t \rightarrow \infty$
  - interest rate  $ightarrow\infty$  as  $t
    ightarrow\infty$
  - Young consumption ightarrow 0 as  $t
    ightarrow\infty$

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## Two useful results

#### Lemma (Backward induction)

For any equilibrium  $S_T = \{S_t\}_{t=T}^{\infty}$  starting at t = T, there exists a unique equilibrium  $S_0 = \{S_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  starting at t = 0 that agrees with  $S_T$  for  $t \ge T$ .

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## Two useful results

### Lemma (Backward induction)

For any equilibrium  $S_T = \{S_t\}_{t=T}^{\infty}$  starting at t = T, there exists a unique equilibrium  $S_0 = \{S_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  starting at t = 0 that agrees with  $S_T$  for  $t \ge T$ .

- Suffices to study equilibrium behavior near steady state
- Hence without loss of generality assume  $(e_t^y, e_t^o) = (e_1G^t, e_2G^t)$  for all t

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### Two useful results

## Theorem (Long run rent growth) In any equilibrium, long run rent growth is

$$G_r \coloneqq \limsup_{t \to \infty} r_t^{1/t} = G^{\gamma} < G.$$

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## Two useful results

## Theorem (Long run rent growth) In any equilibrium, long run rent growth is

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$$G_r := \limsup_{t\to\infty} r_t^{1/t} = G^{\gamma} < G.$$

#### Proof.

- Easy to show  $G_r \leq G^\gamma$
- If  $\liminf_{t\to\infty} S_t/G^t = e_1$ , then  $r_t/S_t \sim G^{(\gamma-1)t}$ , so housing bubble by Bubble Characterization Lemma •?
- But can also show  $R_t \to \infty$ , TVC holds, and no housing bubble, contradiction
- Hence  $\liminf_{t \to \infty} S_t / G^t < e_1$ , the rest easy

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## (Non)existence of fundamental equilibria

- Let  $w := e_2/e_1$  be old to young income ratio
- By previous lemma, rent grows at rate  $G^{\gamma} < G$
- Hence if housing price reflects fundamental value,  $S_t$  grows at rate  $G^\gamma$  and  $S_t \ll e_t^\gamma$
- Economy becomes "house-less" in long run and interest rate becomes

$$R_t = \frac{c_y}{c_z}(c_t^y, c_{t+1}^o) \sim \frac{c_y}{c_z}(e_1G^t, e_2G^{t+1}) = \frac{c_y}{c_z}(1, Gw),$$

• If w sufficiently low,  $R_t < G^{\gamma}$ , implying infinite fundamental value, which is impossible in equilibrium

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## Phase transition of equilibrium housing price regimes



## Housing price regimes and equilibrium interest rate



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## (Non) existence of fundamental equilibria

#### Theorem

Let m = v'(1) and  $w = e_2/e_1$ .

- 1. There exists unique  $w_f^* > 0$  satisfying  $(c_y/c_z)(1, Gw_f^*) = G^{\gamma}$ .
- 2. If  $w > w_f^*$ , there exists fundamental long run equilibrium such that

$$(c_t^y, c_t^o) \sim (e_1 G^t, e_2 G^t), \quad P_t \sim m e_1^{\gamma} \frac{G^{\gamma} c_z}{c_y - G^{\gamma} c_z} \frac{c^{\gamma}}{c_y} G^{\gamma t},$$
  
 $r_t \sim m e_1^{\gamma} \frac{c^{\gamma}}{c_y} G^{\gamma t}, \qquad R_t \sim \frac{c_y}{c_z} > G^{\gamma},$ 

where  $c, c_y, c_z$  are evaluated at (y, z) = (1, Gw).

3. If  $w < w_f^*$ , there exist no fundamental equilibria, and all equilibria bubbly with  $\liminf_{t\to\infty} G^{-t}P_t > 0$ .

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# Discussion of (non)existence

- Existence part ( $w > w_{f}^{*}$ , so young poor enough) just says we can construct fundamental equilibrium with intuitive order of magnitude, so no big deal
- But nonexistence part ( $w < w_f^*$ , so young rich enough) much stronger: no fundamental equilibria can exist at all, regardless of long run behavior such as
  - convergent,

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- cyclic,
- chaotic
- Nonexistence part based on Bubble Necessity Theorem of Hirano and Toda (2024b, JPE)

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## Existence of bubbly equilibrium

• Since economy grows at rate *G*, if bubbly equilibrium exists, housing expenditure *S*<sub>t</sub> must grow at rate *G* 

• Then 
$$R_t = S_{t+1}/P_t 
ightarrow G$$

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- Define detrended variable  $s_t = S_t/(e_1G^t)$
- Then equilibrium condition is nonlinear difference equation

$$Gs_{t+1}c_z = s_tc_y - me_1^{\gamma-1}G^{(\gamma-1)t}c^{\gamma},$$

where functions evaluated at  $(c_t^y, c_{t+1}^o) = (1 - s_t, G(w + s_{t+1}))$ 

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## Existence of bubbly equilibrium

#### Theorem

Let m = v'(1) and  $w = e_2/e_1$ .

- 1. There exists unique  $w_b^* > w_f^*$  satisfying  $\frac{c_y}{c_z}(1, Gw_b^*) = G$ . Let  $s^* = \frac{w_b^* w}{w_b^* + 1}$ .
- 2. For generic G > 1 and  $w < w_b^*$ , there exists bubbly long run equilibrium such that

$$(c_t^{\gamma}, c_t^o) \sim (e_1(1-s^*)G^t, e_1(w+s^*)G^t), \quad P_t \sim e_1s^*G^t,$$
  
 $r_t \sim me_1^{\gamma} \frac{c^{\gamma}}{c_y}G^{\gamma t}, \qquad \qquad R_t \sim G,$ 

where  $c, c_y$  are evaluated at  $(y, z) = (1 - s^*, G(w + s^*))$ .

3. In bubbly equilibrium, there is housing bubble and the price-rent ratio  $P_t/r_t$  diverges to  $\infty$ .

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## Numerical example

Suppose utility is CES, so

$$c(y,z) = \begin{cases} ((1-\beta)y^{1-\sigma} + \beta z^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} & \text{if } 0 < \sigma \neq 1, \\ y^{1-\beta}z^{\beta} & \text{if } \sigma = 1 \end{cases}$$

- Set  $\beta = 1/2$ ,  $\sigma = 1$ ,  $\gamma = 1/2$ , m = 0.1, and G = 1.1
- Then  $w_b^* = 1$ ; consider (a, b) = (95, 105) (fundamental) or (a, b) = (105, 95) (bubbly)

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## Fundamental equilibrium dynamics



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## Bubbly equilibrium dynamics



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## Expectation-driven housing bubbles

- Suppose income distribution between young and old changes between (95, 105) (fundamental) and (105, 95) (bubbly)
- Consider both unexpected change and expected change for 10 periods
- Even if income does not change, access to credit has same effect (see paper)

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### Unexpected income change



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### Expected income change



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Conclusion 00

## Expected income change



 Irving Fisher was right to proclaim "prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau"

#### Expectation-driven housing bubble

Welfare implications

Conclusion 00

## Welfare implications

- Housing (and land) is durable non-reproducible asset
- McCallum (1987) showed land restores dynamic efficiency in (particular) OLG model
- This widely believed result is not true in general

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#### Theorem

Let  $w = e_2/e_1$  and  $w_f^*, w_b^*$  be as above.

- 1. If  $w \ge w_b^*$ , any equilibrium is efficient.
- 2. If  $w < w_b^*$ , any bubbly equilibrium is efficient.
- 3. If  $w < w_b^*$ , any fundamental equilibrium is inefficient.

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- 3. If  $w < w_b^*$ , any fundamental equilibrium is inefficient.
  - McCallum (1987) implicitly assumed steady state growth, which need not hold
  - Hence policymakers have role in guiding equilibrium selection

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Conclusion

# Concluding remarks

- Theory of housing bubbles remains largely underdeveloped due to the fundamental difficulty of attaching bubbles to dividend-paying assets
- Presented bare-bones model of housing bubbles with phase transitions
- Welcome generalizations and quantitative & empirical analysis
- Some testable implications:



## Testable implications

- 1. Income (or available funds) of home buyers  $\uparrow \implies$  bubble more likely
  - Gyourko et al. (2013) document correlation between income growth and housing appreciation
  - Barlevy and Fisher (2021) document correlation between availability of interest-only mortgage and housing appreciation



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- 2. If bubble, both price-rent ratio and price-income ratio increase
  - Amaral et al. (2024) show upward trend in price-rent ratio
  - Bäcker-Peral et al. (2024) show downward trend in housing yield



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### Housing price and rent index



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## Expected long term housing yield in U.K.



Figure: Figure 1 of Bäcker-Peral, Hazell, and Mian (2024)







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